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The “Mysteries of Human Life”1: Dealing with
an Ambiguous Right to Privacy
Brian Reed2

I

I. Introduction

n 1919, the American philosopher Zechariah Chafee told the
story of a peculiar case brought before a judge. The defendant
was a man accused of hitting another man in the nose. Pleading
his case to the judge, the defendant asked whether he had the right
to swing his arms in a free country. The judge responded with this
statement: “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other
man’s nose begins.” 3
Nearly one hundred years have passed since this story was told,
yet the importance of individual rights and their limitations has only
increased. Indeed, the metaphorical line separating where one man’s
right applies and where it does not has become increasingly more
complicated to distinguish.4 Nevertheless, the point of the story is
clear: there are limits to individual rights.
This is particularly true in the context of the right to privacy.
Laws and regulations initially seen as appropriate, even expedient,
are later seen as blatant violations of privacy. Laws protecting social
norms face this challenge. As social norms develop and evolve,
1
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the laws protecting established norms frequently restrict developing ones (such is the case with gay marriage, abortion, and even
physician assisted suicide). Further, while many judicial opinions
acknowledge that privacy is a legitimate individual right, privacy is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. In addition, an appeal
to judicial opinions does not settle the definition of privacy; among
legal philosophers and scholars, the conceptual definition of privacy
is also vague and contested.5 In short, although interpretation of the
Constitution reasonably allows for a right to privacy, there is no consensus on the correct interpretation, and certainly no consensus on
an explicit definition.6
Despite the lack of consensus, the effect of the right to privacy
cannot be understated. Some of the most significant Supreme Court
cases of the last century have been decided in the name of the right to
privacy.7 While judges support the existence of the right to privacy
with various interpretations of constitutional amendments, academics attempt to further define the right to privacy by enumerating what
it allows and where it applies. Considering the perpetual evolution
of privacy issues along with the unsettled definition of the right to
privacy, the important question becomes: How will we know when
the right to privacy should not be expanded?
Rather than contribute to the already sizable literature on whether the right to privacy exists or what the right to privacy allows, my
5
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argument highlights the limits of the right to privacy, or what privacy should not allow. I acknowledge that privacy is a legitimate right
reasonably implied in the Constitution and established in numerous
Supreme Court cases. Yet less attention is given to limitations of this
right. In my argument, I will show that the right to privacy should
be maximized, but I will also show that expansion beyond privacy’s
proper “point of maximization” will decrease individual rights, even
(ironically) the right to privacy itself. Given the abstract, conflicting
definitions of the right to privacy, my argument identifies limitations in
previous court rulings (and the reasons behind these limitations) that
should be generalized and applied to future cases concerning the
right to privacy. These limitations will serve to solidify the definition of the right to privacy in the future.

The Evolution of Privacy in the Constitution:
As illustrated in what follows, interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment have shaped the right to privacy for more than a century. The Due Process Clause, contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was originally intended to prevent the violation
of individual rights without proper legal actions in the context of
outlawing slavery.8 The purpose of the Due Process Clause was
quickly expanded (and rightly so) to prohibit and prevent any form
of violation of individual rights without proper legal action. While
the changes introduced with this new legislation were needed and
appropriate, its vague wording has also provided justification for a
dramatic expansion of individual rights, perhaps even beyond the
amendment’s original intent. This section explores the evolution of
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically, how
it relates to the right to privacy.

II. The Lochner Era
The earliest instance in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
used to justify the right to privacy occurred in 1905 in Lochner

8
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v. New York.9 The case involved a baker who contracted with an
employee to work more than the maximum number of hours allowed
under New York law. Although intended to protect individuals from
harm caused by exposure to unsafe and hazardous work environments, the law was challenged because it restricted an individual’s
privacy to buy and sell labor (in this context labor was considered an
individual’s possession).10 In the majority opinion, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the New York law saying,
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under that provision no state can
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part
of the liberty protected by this amendment.11
Lochner’s appeal to the Due Process Clause established a precedent
that was repeatedly cited in cases throughout the early twentieth century, invalidating numerous economic and labor regulations. Soon
after Lochner, in Adair v. United States, the Due Process Clause was
applied to uphold a “yellow-dog contract” (prohibiting employees
from forming a union).12 Interestingly, while the Due Process Clause
was used in Lochner to strike down state legislation limiting the
“right to contract,” the same clause was used in Adair to protect legislation preserving the right to contract.
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.
9

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
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So the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer,
for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer,
for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employee.13
Although the context of Adair is different from Lochner, it represents yet another protection of an individual’s privacy, specifically
the right to contract. According to Adair, just as employees had the
privacy to sell their labor for however many hours as they saw fit—
regardless of how unwise such action may be—employers had the
privacy to determine the conditions under which they will purchase
an employee. Though the actions of employer and employee may
be unwise, it was deemed unconstitutional for the government to
interfere.14
As an epilogue to Adair, the Supreme Court again protected
employers’ privacy to create yellow-dog contracts in Coppage v.
Kansas. The majority opinion, by Justice Pitney, stated:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune. . . . It is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that
are the necessary result of the exercise of [the freedom of
contract and the right of private property] . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment, in declaring that a State shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law,” gives to each of these an equal sanction; it recognizes
“liberty” and “property” as co-existent human rights, and
debars the States from any unwarranted interference with
either.15

13
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At this time, the Supreme Court appeared to reach a consensus that
the right to privacy did in fact include the right to contract and that
this right found its place in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause, however, was not the only support
for court rulings against economic regulation during the Lochner
era. For example, the Supreme Court referred to the Tenth Amendment in Hammer v. Dagenhart and Carter v. Coal Company in order
to invalidate federal regulation of the economy. 16 Still, the precedent
for protecting economic privacy was largely a product of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment described above, which defined
privacy—in the context of the right to contract—as fundamentally
inherent in the Due Process Clause.

III. Post-Lochner Era
In the late 1930s, the Supreme Court shifted dramatically from
its Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause foundation for the
right to privacy. Under the Lochner era interpretation of privacy,
the federal government was prohibited from intervening in intrastate
economic activity (see Hammer v. Dagenhart).17 However, faced
with the crisis of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court chose
to nullify its previous interpretation of the Due Process Clause to
enable the passage of New Deal legislation. For instance, yellow-dog
contracts—previously protected by the Supreme Court—were outlawed in 1932 by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.18 As the attention of U.S.
16

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269 (1918); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291-292 (1936).
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Amendment to the Constitution).
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legislation and Court rulings shifted toward economic recovery, the
controversy over the definition of privacy faded into the background.
After the Depression, privacy again took center stage in numerous laws and court rulings. While the context of the privacy debate
was limited to economic privacies during the Lochner era, the
debate now focuses on social privacy. Without question, privacy in
the social and economic context is an important element of liberty.
Clearly, the right to privacy should be recognized in many situations,
yet the Supreme Court’s decision to allow New Deal legislation (in
effect, disregarding the privacy definition found in the Due Process
Clause) made it difficult to determine where to draw support for a
right to privacy in the Constitution.19 Even today, the controversy
over the answer to this question is apparent in a number of Supreme
Court decisions involving social privacy. While most recognize privacy, there is significant disagreement regarding the basis for the
existence of privacy as a right established in the Constitution.
Griswold v Connecticut is perhaps the most significant Supreme
Court decision expanding the right to privacy in the social context.
Griswold questioned whether the right to marital privacy was legitimate and, if so, was compromised by a Connecticut law prohibiting
the use of birth control. Established in 1879, this law had been challenged repeatedly, but had been upheld until Griswold in 1965. At
this time, the law was invalidated because according to the Court
it did violate the right to marital privacy. In this sense, Griswold
was revolutionary because it was the first unequivocal recognition of
privacy as a right inherent in the Constitution since the Lochner era,
thus bringing privacy back to the foreground of attention.
Although Griswold v. Connecticut established the legitimacy of
social privacy, it added to the ambiguity of the Constitutional definition of privacy. Despite the Court’s 7-2 decision, there were multiple
arguments about the source of privacy in the Constitution. While
most Justices agreed that privacy in marriage—and privacy in general—is a right protected by the Constitution, they differed on the
definition of privacy. In one of the most controversial definitions,
19
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Justice Douglas explained privacy’s existence in the Constitution
as follows:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . .
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘‘in any house’’
in time of peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the ‘‘right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.’’ The Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”20
Though Douglas’ opinion certainly clarified the issue of marital privacy, his discussion of “emanations” and “penumbras” made it difficult to know where privacy does not apply. Adding to the ambiguous
definition of privacy, several other Justices provided concurring
opinions explaining their own definition of privacy. For instance,
Justice Goldberg refers to a marital privacy right “not confined to
the terms of the Bill of Rights,” but “supported both by numerous
decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court’s opinion, and by the
language and history of the Ninth Amendment.”21
In addition to the opinions of Goldberg and Douglas, Justice
Harlan wrote a third concurring opinion but argued that privacy
was inherent in the Due Process Clause, reverting back to the Loch20

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

21

Id. at 486-487.
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ner era definition of privacy. Harlan claimed that “the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.”22
Indeed, dissent among Supreme Court Justices is clear from
Griswold alone. Douglas claims that privacy comes from “emanations” and “penumbras” throughout the Constitution. Meanwhile,
Goldberg points to the Ninth Amendment and the Liberty Clause as
the source of privacy. Finally, Harlan disregards the Court’s previous
decision to invalidate the relationship between privacy and the Due
Process Clause, claiming due process as sufficient support for the
existence of privacy. Since Griswold, the debate over the source of
privacy in the Constitution has continued in other cases.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), Casey, citing Roe v.
Wade (1973), challenged five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. In response, the Supreme Court upheld the Roe v.
Wade ruling and invalidated the provisions in question. Explaining
their decision, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter claimed
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.23
Again, O’Connor’s opinion resolves any doubt regarding the defense
of privacy in the right to abortion, but it does not clarify where privacy should be limited. Recent debate surrounding the new health
care legislation suggests that issues relevant to privacy will continue
to evolve. As the government attempts to enforce a law demanding
that citizens buy health insurance, Supreme Court review of this leg22
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islation will be heavily influenced by the definition of privacy they
choose to support. According to the Lochner era Court rulings and
definition of the right to privacy, it is likely that such a provision
would be classified as economic regulation and deemed unconstitutional. However, if the Supreme Court chooses to emphasize the
socially concerned emanations and penumbras of the right to privacy, the outcome of its review could be significantly different.
Review of the recent health care legislation provides just one
example of the critical importance of a clearly defined right to privacy. Without a unified conclusion regarding the source of the right
to privacy in the Constitution, the Supreme Court risks arbitrary
expansion of the right to privacy beyond its proper point of maximization, even to the extent that privacy expansion may violate other
rights that are explicitly included in the Constitution. In an attempt
to clarify the limits of the right to privacy and establish the point of
maximization, I will identify a few instances in which the Supreme
Court has limited the right to privacy in specific circumstances. I
will then discuss how these context-specific limitations could be
used as general limitations for future privacy cases and legislation.

III. Limitations of Privacy
While there is plenty of discussion on whether privacy legally
exists and whether the right to privacy should apply to specific new
“zones of privacy,”24 there is significantly less discussion of the proper limitations of privacy. This may be because privacy is so difficult
to define, and specific limitations require a fixed, clear definition.
On the other hand, the disparity may exist because scholars are more
concerned with violations of individual privacy than they are with
instances of too much privacy (not many people will complain about
having too many privacy rights). An argument in favor of establishing
limits on privacy could even be misinterpreted as a threat, aiming
to take rights away from individuals. Nonetheless, limiting privacy
with the intent of maximizing it will yield the greatest amount of
utility. Though not often considered, it is possible for privacy—when
there is too much of it—to have a negative effect on society, as will
24
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be shown in the following examples. In mathematics, identifying the
point of maximization on a bell curve is simple: find the highest
point on the curve or the point immediately before the values of the
graph begin to decrease. Alas, this concept is much more abstract in
the law. Therefore, it is important to study indicators of maximization, or instances when expanding the right to privacy to a new zone
would compromise other constitutional rights. Recognizing these
indicators will help, in turn, to recognize when the right to privacy
has approached its point of maximization. The decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg, Kelley v. Johnson, and Olmstead v. U.S. can
help us better identify indicators of maximization when considered
under a new light.

IV. The Equal Protection Limit
The emergence of physician assisted suicide illustrates the
expanding boundaries of privacy. Though physician assisted suicide is illegal in most states, the simple fact that the right to physician assisted suicide is considered shows that privacy is, indeed,
an evolving issue. In 1997, Dr. Harold Glucksberg petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Washington law prohibiting
physician assisted suicide.25 While the Washington law banned physician assisted suicide, it did allow a doctor to withhold life-sustaining treatment from a patient if the patient so desired. According to
Glucksberg, if a mentally competent, terminally ill patient could
elect to refuse life-sustaining treatment, then a patient should not
be prohibited from direct physician assisted suicide if the patient
so desires. In short, Glucksberg claimed that a patient’s right to
die with dignity and in peace should be considered a constitutional
right to privacy. Banning qualified patients from making this choice
placed an “undue burden”26 on the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Prior to the Supreme Court hearing, however, the Washington
law was overturned, then re-established upon a subsequent appeal.
25

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-706 1997.
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The case eventually reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At
this point, the Circuit Court declared
After “[w]eighing and then balancing” this interest [the right
to physician assisted suicide] against Washington’s various
interests, the court held that the State’s assisted-suicide ban
was unconstitutional “as applied to terminally ill competent
adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.”27
Once again, the Washington law was overturned. Indeed, the ambivalence surrounding Washington’s law on physician assisted suicide
reflects the difficulty found in establishing a proper limit on the right
to privacy.
Despite Glucksberg’s appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court limited
the right to privacy in large part to avoid a conflict with the Equal
Protection Clause, which states that “no state shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”28 After
surveying the legal history regarding suicide, the Court claimed that
in hundreds of years the law has never facilitated any form of taking life. Further defending the Court’s position, Justice Rehnquist
argued that there is a legitimate state interest to protect the sanctity of life, referring to the severe punishments in place for those
guilty of homicide. However, for the purposes of this discussion, the
most important reason for his decision was to preserve the rights of
those who would be disproportionately disadvantaged by the legalization of the right to privacy: “The State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled
persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.”29 Rehnquist cited the
decision in Cruzan v. Missouri along with research done by the New
York Task Force (a group created to investigate the potential consequences of physician assisted suicide in New York in the context
27

Id. at 709.

28

U.S. Const.amend. XIV, § 1.

29

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of Vacco v. Quil).30 From these sources, Rehnquist drew the conclusion that the legalization of physician assisted suicide would create
a legitimate, systematic bias against discrete and insular minorities,
specifically the poor and disabled. 31
Later arguments have strengthened Rehnquist’s equal protection rationale. According to Siegel, legalization of physician assisted suicide would place a significant disadvantage on the disabled
(1998). Theoretically, physician assisted suicide would create a legal
environment where it would be easier for the disabled to receive
assisted suicide than it would be for the non-disabled. Courts and physicians would be tempted to see the disabilities as medical conditions
which lower the quality of life. Bouvia v. Superior Court, McKay v.
Bergstedt, and Georgia v. McAfee provide examples of instances in
which the courts demonstrated unequal leniency in granting permission for assisted suicide to disabled plaintiffs.32 While the initial
ruling in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals called the supposed
threat against the disabled “ludicrous on its face,” the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the claim as a legitimate possibility. Based on the
persuasive influence of doctors over patients in terminal conditions,
the Court held that even subtle differences between the treatments
of disabled patients versus non-disabled patients would likely influence the decision to choose physician assisted suicide, increasing
the probability of suicide for those who are disabled (from the case
description Washington v. Glucksberg).33
In addition to disadvantages imposed on the disabled, legalized
physician assisted suicide would impose undue pressure on the lower

30

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 731 (1997).

31

See id. at 725.

32

See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d, Cal. Rprtr., 297 (1986);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 Nev. P. 2d, 617 (1990); State of Ga. v. McAfee,
385 Ga. S.E. 2d 651 (1989).

33
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725
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economic class.34 In an effort to lower the costs of palliative care
which would be charged to family members after they die, or simply
because the patient cannot afford the treatment costs that they would
receive from choosing alternative treatment, poorer citizens would
have greater economic incentives to choose assisted suicide than
middle or upper class citizens. Their economic position may even
bias the counsel given by physicians, making the physicians themselves more likely to suggest assisted suicide as a possible course
of action to lower class patients than middle or upper-class patients.
The disproportionate disadvantage placed on those in lower classes
and the disabled violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
Recognizing that expanding the right to privacy would, in reality,
decrease the rights of the poor and disabled helps establish an important indicator of maximization. With other issues, it may be easier
to recognize when a new application of a constitutional right goes
too far. With privacy, however, this is more difficult. The Supreme
Court’s decision to weight the rights of the poor and disabled more
heavily than the privacy of those desiring physician assisted suicide can be generalized, making it easier to decide whether privacy
should be expanded. Thus, any expansion of privacy which compromises the Equal Protection Clause should be considered an indicator
of maximization. In these situations legislators and justices must be
especially mindful of the possibility that privacy may be close to its
point of maximization. Ironically, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been used more often as justification for
34

See Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The
Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments
Having Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28 Seton Hall
L. Rev.776, 785 (1998); see also New York State Department of Health,
When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical
Context (1994).

35

See Ronald A. Lindsay, Should we Impose Quotas? Evaluating the
“Disparate Impact” Argment Against Legalization of Assisted Suicide, 30
J.L. Med. & Ethics 6, 7-8 (2002) (In this article, Lindsay actually argues
against disparate impact. I cite him here only because he also provides a
helpful and concise review of the literature in favor of disparate impact).
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expansion of individual rights. However, in this context, it provides
justification against such an expansion. In this way, the Fourteenth
Amendment actually solidifies the right to privacy by providing a
limitation of privacy, rather than obscuring it as it has in other interpretations.36

V. The State Interest Limit
In 1976, Kelley brought a case all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court because he wanted to grow out his hair. The circumstances
may seem like a non-issue, except that Kelley was a member of the
Suffolk County Police Force in New York and as such was subject
to a strict grooming standard, regulating both hair length and style.
Kelley argued that the grooming standards were “not based upon
the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community.”37
Thus, the regulation violated his individual privacy to determine his
own appearance; this right was, according to Kelley, included in the
Fourteenth Amendment.38 When the case was first tried, the District Court of the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case;
however, upon appeal the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal and invalidated the grooming standard. “The
Court of Appeals went on to decide that ‘choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s personal liberty’ and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”39
Despite the case’s appeal to the right to privacy (alluded to in
the Fourteenth Amendment), the U.S. Supreme Court limited the
right to privacy in the interest of preserving the efficacy and cohesion of
the police force. The Court agreed that this interest outweighed and
overruled Kelley’s interest to preserve individual privacy. Again,
Rehnquist offered the majority opinion, explaining that an ordinary
citizen claiming violation of privacy may be justified in this context,
but because Kelley represented the Suffolk County Police Depart36

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

37

Id. at 241.

38

See id. at 238.

39

Kelley v. Johnson, 425 US 238, 241 (1976).
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ment, he was not to be treated as an ordinary citizen. Acknowledging the danger of treating government employees as some form of
lower-class citizen, Rehnquist defends his claim further:
More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal and state
employees lying at the core of the First Amendment. CSC
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive
regulations of state employees where the claim implicates
only the more general contours of the substantive liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision on this issue, the Second Circuit Court had dismissed the claim that grooming standards were
significantly related to the preservation of some “genuine public
need.”41 In response, Rehnquist held that the question at issue was
instead whether there was a reasonable, rational connection between
grooming standards and the protection of person and property.
That policemen would be more easily recognizable to members of
the public and would develop esprit de corps among the policemen
themselves was seen as sufficient rationale for upholding the grooming standard.
It should be clear that the Supreme Court was not advocating
for the removal of privacy; indeed, this would threaten even basic
liberties explicit in the Constitution, such as freedom of speech and
freedom of religion. Rather, the Supreme Court effectively elevated
the privacy of possessions for the general public above the privacy
of personal appearance for the individual. This ruling (along with
the ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg) shows that privacy can only
be expanded so far before it inevitably begins to compromise other
40

Id. at 245

41

Id. at 242
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necessary, significant individual rights. In the context of Kelley v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court provides precedent for the limitation
of privacy when a proposed expansion would distort or decrease the
efficacy of government institutions designed to protect the person
and property of individuals.42 In this context, privacy (in the form
of grooming standards) must be limited for privacy’s sake (the person and property of individuals). Here again we find an indicator of
maximization when positive growth in one “zone of privacy” leads
to negative growth in another.
Courts considering further proposals to expand or make explicit
the right to privacy in the Constitution should consider a general
state interest limitation—in addition to the equal protection limit
discussed previously—before giving approval for expansion.
Despite the legitimate value of privacy in maintaining a free society,
Kelley v. Johnson suggests that too much individual privacy can be
detrimental. Widespread recognition of this limitation will further
solidify the definition of privacy in the future so that privacy is not
expanded beyond the point where other privacies are compromised
as a result.

VI. The National Security Limit
Though similar to the state interest limitation presented in
the previous section, the national security limitation deserves consideration given the high level of controversy surrounding the issue.
Of all the limitations presented, this limitation provides the most delicate delineation between appropriate and inappropriate expansions
of the right to privacy. Support for the establishment of a national
security limit can first be found in Olmstead v. U.S. (1928). In the
case Olmstead, the leader of an organization involved in the illegal
sale and distribution of alcohol during Prohibition, complained that
evidence used in his conviction was illegally obtained. More specifically, four probation officers wire-tapped Olsmtead’s telephone and
recorded conversations between Olmstead and his partners that contained descriptions of their illegal business plans. When Olmstead
was arrested and brought to trial, the evidence gathered from the
42
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wire-tapping was used against him. After his conviction, Olmstead
appealed his case on the grounds that his individual right to privacy,
as granted him in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, had been compromised; admitting the illegitimacy of the evidence would consequently exonerate Olmstead.
Initially, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
to invalidate the evidence saying that it did violate the privacy given
to Olmstead in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (which protect
against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as forced testimony
against oneself). The Court argued, “It is of the very nature of the
telephone service that it shall be private…The wire tapper destroys
this privacy. He invades the person of the citizen, and his house,
secretly and without warrant. Having regard to the substance of
things, he would not do this more truly if he secreted himself in the
home of the citizen.”43
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, choosing instead to
limit Olmstead’s right to privacy by allowing the evidence to be used
in court. Regarding the supposed violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained unethically
did not compel an individual to testify against himself in court. Further, regarding the supposed violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court argued that the ability to invalidate evidence unethically obtained did not belong to the Supreme Court (though the
Court did acknowledge the possibility of this outcome in the future,
but only in the form of new legislation from Congress44). Because
there was no existing law prohibiting such evidence from consideration—and because no physical “search and seizure” had been conducted—the Court ruled that it did not have the authority to deny the
evidence from consideration in the trial.
Based only on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Olmstead—especially referencing the Court’s allowance for legislation banning
illegally obtained evidence—it is difficult to identify limitations of
privacy. Thus, further investigation of subsequent court rulings and

43

Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 454 (1928).

44

See id. at. 465.

Right to Privacy

19

legislation is necessary. Olmstead, however, is significant because it
presents the first balancing of national security and individual privacy.
Olmstead was partially overturned in Katz v. U.S. (1967). Katz,
convicted of selling gambling information across state lines (a federal offence), claimed that evidence gained from wiretapped phone
conversations was impermissible in Court because the process by
which it was gained violated his right to privacy, inherent in the
Fourth Amendment. Though the circumstances of the case are nearly identical to that of Olmstead, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Katz, claiming that the interpretation of privacy had evolved since
Olmstead.
Although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure
of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held
that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements, overheard without any “technical trespass under
. . . local property law”.
Here again, we find evidence that the definition of the right to privacy continues to evolve and expand over time. I should be clear that I
do not offer a claim regarding the appropriateness of this expansion;
instead, I offer the claim that constitutional privacy continues to
expand, and that it is possible for privacy to expand beyond the point
that it continues to benefit society. With this in mind, it is important
to mention the Supreme Court’s statement that the actions of the federal agents responsible for the wiretapping would likely have been
justified had they first gained the proper consent from a third-party
judge. Their actions were illegal primarily because the agents did
not first acquire a search warrant. In essence, the Supreme Court
did recognize that wiretapping was appropriate in certain situations,
even when the suspect is unaware of the invasion of their privacy.
The issues of wiretapping, national security, and individual privacy again came to the foreground when the Patriot Act was instituted in 2001. A response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the
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Act significantly reduced legal restraints on federal law enforcement.
Most important in this context was the sanctioning of roving wiretaps (wiretaps not restricted to any single communication device, but
able to transfer to any device used by the suspect in question). While
certain elements of the Patriot Act have been brought into question,
the wiretapping clause was renewed by President Obama as of 2011.45
Until now, there have been no further court cases involving the issue.
There is no question that there should be strict and detailed
restrictions on the appropriate circumstances for wiretapping. However, the principle illustrated in the legal history of wiretapping
again suggests that it is possible for privacy to overstep its appropriate bounds. In the event that privacy were expanded to the point
that wiretapping was totally marginalized, national security would
be reduced by a significant extent. Seen in this light, increasing individual privacy would risk the preservation of privacy because an
individual’s right to be left alone would be legitimately endangered.
Recognizing that threats to national security on a grand scale are
unlikely to be a daily occurrence, it should still be a significant consideration. The decision to establish a national security limit on the
right to privacy in the future should be taken seriously.

VII. Conclusion
It may be intuitive to assume that all individual rights are independent; thus it is possible for everyone to maintain an unlimited
level of one’s own liberty without affecting the liberty of those
around him. This assumption, however, is faulty. While personal
liberty (or privacy) should be maximized, there is a point at which
privacy begins to decrease in its utility to society, and even becomes
destructive. As the constitutional support for the right to privacy
continues to be molded over time, it is especially crucial to limit
the expansion of privacy at its point of maximization so that privacy
does not expand beyond its appropriate “zones.”46 The challenge will
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be to distinguish these zones of privacy, where they begin and where
they end.
Analysis of the limits placed on the right to privacy in the past
strongly suggests that the point of maximization for privacy occurs
when privacy begins to compromise other rights explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Given the nature of individual privacy, it is
possible, even likely, that continued expansion of privacy rights for
individuals in specific zones can in other zones decrease the protection of privacy. This point is clear in Washington v. Glucksberg,
where the right of a terminally-ill, mentally competent individual
to commit suicide is limited in order to preserve equal protection
under the law lower-class or disabled citizens. The point is reiterated
in Kelley v. Johnson and Olmstead v. U.S., where an expansion of
privacy comes at the expense of a legitimate state interest or at the
expense of a nation’s ability to protect its citizens, the right to privacy has expanded beyond the point at which it continues to benefit
society.
When taken to the extremes, privacy can be a double-edged
sword. On one edge, privacy can be regulated so heavily that individuals have very little privacy, if any at all. Given that the major focus
of public attention centers on the expansion of privacy, it is necessary to increase awareness regarding the other edge of the sword:
the trend towards absolute privacy also decreases individual rights,
even the right to privacy itself. Privacy is a legitimate right; indeed it
is crucial for a free society. However, the unrestrained expansion of
individual privacy may be just as damaging to individual privacy (as
well as other constitutional rights) as is unrestrained privacy. Thus,
future decisions to expand privacy should not be granted until the
limitations of privacy are fully considered.

